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ABSTRACT
Cavett, Lee A. M.S., Purdue University, May 2016. Using Security Risk Analysis:
Is The Bring Your Own Device Policy Becoming A Liability Risk Within
Healthcare?. Major Professor: James E. Dietz.
Using computer simulation modeling, this research examined the problems
contributing to data breaches within the healthcare industry. The study attempted
to answer two questions: 1) is the Bring Your Own Device policy becoming a
liability risk within health clinics causing an increase in data breaches and 2) is
there a lower risk using Bring Your Own Device within the clinic compared to using
desktop computers. iPad was the primary focused device as one of many Bring Your
Own Devices. The study used a randomly generated sample of an approximate
2,700 patients, one nurse and doctor on a eight hour work-day within the clinic
(eight A.M - five P.M) considering a one hour lunch break in between. The outcome
of the study revealed that the Bring Your Own Policy had a lower risk than using
desktops within health clinics.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, healthcare organizations have increasingly embraced
automation of medical information including the usage of Electronic Health Records
(EHR). As the amount of electronic data being handled by healthcare systems
continue to increase, it has become more of a focal point of emerging threats and
vulnerabilities. Patients’ secure data are often comprised due to data breaches.
Security rules had been more recently promulgated but critics point to data
breaches that result from a lack of proper protection on healthcare systems and
equipment containing sensitive data. Many health organizations implemented a
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy which allow employees to use their device
for medical usage. BYOD is commonly being use throughout many hospitals which
could possibly be the cause of an increase in data breaches. The researcher analyzed
if the BYOD policy is consider a liability risk by comparing wireless devices to
desktop computers.
1.1 Scope
In this study, the researcher analyzed and determined if the BYOD policy
was becoming a liability resulting to an increase data breaches as it continued to
rise within healthcare. To narrow the number of smart hand-held devices used by
many personal users; the particular device that was focused on was Apple Inc.’s
iPad 9.2 iOS version. To reduce the complexity of the project, it was proposed that




• Based on increasing threats to IT infrastructure, are iPads becoming a
liability risk within healthcare clinics?
• Comparing iPads (as one of many wireless BYODs) to desktop computers,
which has the lowest risk factor within a healthcare clinic?
1.3 Significance
The U.S government allocated approximately 19 billion a year in funding for
programs to help healthcare providers implement EHR as part of the economic
stimulus package enacted in February 2009 (Bardhan & Thouin, 2012). Usage of
EHR necessitates a more critical look at data security. The use of EHR increased
throughout many hospitals and clinics, which was also leading into an increase of
revenue. Proposals suggested that integrated EHR provided several benefits, some
of which included: a reduction in costs, improved quality of care, the promotion of
evidence-based medicine, enhanced record keeping and mobility (Fernandez-Aleman,
Senor, Lozoya, & Toval, 2013).
However, with EHRs being interconnected, there had been several data
breach reports which has emerged over the years; let alone, a BYOD policy can be
used for doctors to access patient records while working. Few IT leaders saw iPads
as healthcare “game-changers,” especially with the view of iPad EHR
implementations as a way to promote useful compliance for physicians (ClickCare,
2014). Therefore, defining if the BYOD policy is causing an increase of data
breaches is imperative. This determination could also aid hospitals to increase
patients’ trust and help patients feel safe and secure with healthcare institutions
holding their critical information.
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1.4 Assumptions
The assumptions for this study included:
• iPads (iOS 9.2 version) are most commonly used by staff within clinics.
• Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health - Lafayette East Health was the closest health
facility in Lafayette, IN utilizing current health IT systems.
1.5 Limitations
The limitations for this study included:
• iPads is the primary device as one of the several Bring Your Own Devices used
within the health clinic.
• One business day (eight A.M to five P.M) was the time frame within the
simulation model to conduct the research.
• The study focused on the the risk, negligence, and time when the staff in the
treatment room with the patient.
• HIPAA’s tier one violation was possible cause of a data breach throughout the
model.
1.6 Delimitation
The delimitation for this study included:
• The researcher did not focus on the risk factors outside of the health clinic.
• The researcher did not focus on all mobile devices and tablets used within the
hospital.




In the broader context of thesis writing, the author defines the following
terms:
Breach: unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health
information (HealthIT.gov, 2009).
Electronic Health Records: is used primarily for purposes of setting objectives and
planning patient care, documenting the delivery of care and assessing the
outcomes of care. It includes information regarding patient needs during
episodes of care provided by different health care professionals (Hayrinen,
Saranto, & Nykanen, 2008).
Electronic Medical Records: a digital version of a paper chart that contains all of a
patients medical history. It is mostly used by providers for diagnosis and
treatment (Fowler, 2015).
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health: is a law that was
passed in 2009, designed primarily to modernize the flow of health information
(Solove, 2013).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: is a law passed by Congress in
1996 [and amended over time] to regulate and protect the confidentially of
personal health data collected and used by health care organizations (Fowler,
2015).
Security Breach Notification Laws: are laws should provide American businesses
with incentives to make significant changes in the way they handle and store
consumer information in order to reduce the risk of data breaches (Winn,
2009).
Social Engineer: “is a technique an outside hackers use of psychological tricks on
legitimate users of a computer system, in order to obtain information he needs
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to gain access to the system, or getting needed information (for example, a
password) from person rather than breaking into a system” (Granger, 2001).
1.8 Summary
This chapter provided the scope, significance, research questions,
assumptions, limitations, delimitation, definitions, and other background
information for the research project. The next chapter provides a review of the
literature relevant of Electronic Health Records.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Technology has made a huge impact in the healthcare industry including
record keeping. Earlier, medical records was stored in a paper format in large
patient record storage closets. Filing and writing patients critical information by
hand seems time consuming compared to the high-end technology used today.
Medical records includes a great deal of sensitive information such as: personal
information (driver license number, social security number, and date of birth
insurance); medical diagnoses; treatment interventions; and financial information.
Patients believe that this sensitive information will be shared appropriately and
safeguarded. Policymakers push initiatives to bring healthcare into the digital age
(Nigrin, 2014). With the increase of technology, healthcare workers have or are
moving paper patient record keeping to electronic record keeping. In the healthcare
industry, this is better known as Electronic Medical Record (EMR) or Electronic
Health Record (EHR). With hospitals transitioning from filing patients’ records in
storage cabinets to electronically storing records, it’s imperative to address security
risk factors that could potentially lead a breach.
2.1 Security Risk Leading into Data Breaches
As in any other industry, in addition to safeguarding against the compromise
of sensitive data, healthcare entities must now protect themselves against direct
attacks meant to disrupt operations (Perakslis, 2014). Personal health records and
other services that enable consumers to store and manage their own or their
families’ health information are now being control by third parties such as: Google
and WebMD; these are also considered risk factors for data breaches (McGraw,
Dempsey, Harris, & Goldman, 2009). According to the Health Insurance Portability
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and Accountability Act (HIPAA), consumers have the right to access their medical
records including the right to receive a copy “in the form or format requested,” if
those records are “readily producible” in that format (McGraw et al., 2009). Often
times, information such as personal data or identification is shared by the consumer.
When personal data is shared, it is a major risk and can possibly result in
identity fraud. Ponemon (2013), a research center focused on data protection and
information security policy, conducted a survey of 807 consumers who had
self-reported medical identity theft. Thirty-one (31) percent had voluntarily shared
identity credentials with a family member. When asked why, 92 percent did so
because their family member lacked health insurance, 89 percent because the
individual could not afford to pay for medical treatments, and 67 percent did so in a
healthcare emergency. Medical identities use for trading could result in accounting
and financial information that can be used to sell to third parties for malicious
intent. In fact, EHR have 50 times the black market value of a credit card (Bitglass,
2014). In these types of situations, victims could possibly experience identity fraud,
theft, or other possible attacks involving his or her medical record; however, the
victim will not report the incident as shown in Figure 2.1 (Ponemon Institute,
2015).
Employees do their best to ensure patients’ EHR information is safe and
secure; however, the value of EHRs were probed according to research. Recent
studies have questioned the value of EHRs and clinical decision support systems and
their impact on the quality of patient care; however, policymakers may find it
necessary to go further and prohibit certain uses or disclosures of data in Personal
Health Records, regardless of consent (Bardhan & Thouin, 2012; McGraw et al.,
2009). Personal health data also are migrating onto the Internet through an
exploding array of health information sites, support groups, and other on-line health
tools, which falls outside of HIPAA unless they are being offered by covered entities
(McGraw et al., 2009).
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Figure 2.1. Reasons Medical Identity Theft Incident Not Reported
(Ponemon Institute, 2015)
Besides gaining access to hospital information systems, computer viruses and
malware can infect clinical monitoring devices; more so, network devices used by
medical personnel such as smart devices used by doctors and nurses, even surgically
implanted electronic devices (Kierkegaard, 2011). Having a virus infecting clinical
monitoring devices or networked devices can be a scary situation especially if the
staff is in the process of examining a patient. As compared to traditional IT systems
involving incidents, such as a hacked MRI machine, can carry physical consequences
as well as policy and financial impacts (Filkins, 2015). Anything that is
interconnected could be in risk of being hacked. It could be argued often times EHR
system that is purchased from outside vendors comes with pre-set privacy and
security capabilities (Fernandez-Aleman et al., 2013). Purchasing through outside
vendors is also known as outsourcing.
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Outsourcing aids health organizations in many ways. Outsourcing reduces
operational and software cost which results in a main critical advantage; however,
outsourcing has its disadvantages. Significant outsourcing occurs in order to store
patients’ medical information. For instance, some of the EHR software packages
includes: MediTouch, WRS Health, Modernizing Medicine, etc.) According to
Wright (2004), sharing software with an outsourcing firm could cause a breach in
the organization’s licensing agreement or a copyright infringement. The level of
accessibility rises when there are several third parties involve. The usage of a third
party (using outside sourcing) allowing joint access of the EHR software could result
into various users having access to the providing health organizations system. This
development increases the chances of the system being breach. Despite outsourcing
commonly used within businesses, the vulnerabilities involved are crucially
demanding. With the numerous of outsourcing firms involved, it put data such as:
credit card information, EHR, and account information at risk. As a result, when
third parties are included, the organization may lose control over its system security
administration creating a huge effect against the organization, according to Wright
(2004)’s study.
Ponemon Institute (2015) mentions that employee negligence (70 percent) is
the main security risk followed by use of public cloud services and cyber attackers
(Ponemon Institute, 2015). A technique that is used but without significant on is
social engineering. This attack can occur without the employees’ awareness. When
this technique is being applied, plenty of information can be retrieved and mostly
occurs as manipulation through a psychological approach. “A social engineering
tactic can be used by an attacker to gain illegal access to the pseudononymisation
algorithm or the patient list, thus compromising the system,” explained by
Fernandez-Aleman et al. (2013). This technique can occur in several ways. Social
engineering methods includes: phone, dumpster diving, on-line, persuasion, and
reverse social engineering using public information. Each method results to either
password and/or username comprise to an employee or EHR files (Granger, 2001).
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Healthcare industries and many other companies have tons of trash that are being
disposed at the end of the day; in healthcare, maybe the most simple method for an
intruder. According to Granger (2001), types of material that could be used for
possible data breach found in the dumpster are: organizational charts, memos,
company phone books, company policy manuals, calendars of meetings, system
manuals, printouts of sensitive data or login names and passwords, printouts of
source code, and outdated hardware (Granger, 2001). Another security risk that
may not seem as a threat now, but could possibly become a major security risk in
the future is the BYOD policy.
2.1.1 BYOD Policy
The BYOD policy was initiated in the year 2009 by a top IT company and it
pertains to the policy of allowing employees to bring privately owned devices such
as smartphones, tablets and laptops into their workplace for usage and access to
company applications and information (ClickCare, 2014). Healthcare providers
typical that the Health Information Technology Department ensures that data and
network on mobile devices is safe and secure in larger organizations. With BYOD
becoming commonly used within the healthcare industry, it could also present a
security concern. Eighty-eight (88) percent of organizations permit employees and
medical staff to use their own mobile devices to connect to their organizations
networks or enterprise systems (Ponemon Institute, 2015). BYOD allows health
organizations the opportunity to increase efficiency and flexibility using EHR
systems; however, the level of accessibility increases the system vulnerability and
potential for data loss from BYOD lost devices.
To go in-depth of BYOD, there are several smart devices that can be use in
hospitals. iPad represents a significant portion of mobile devices employed in
healthcare; in addition will most likely to benefit from 4G technology in the coming
years (ClickCare, 2014; Deloitte, 2014).
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2.1.1.1. iPads
iPads are becoming popular to consumers. According to Deloitte (2014)’s
survey and ClickCare (2014), Apple’s Inc. is in control of the market: 54 percent of
iPhone owners have an iPad while only six percent have a Samsung tablet. In fact,
Apple’s iPads sold over 14 million tablets in the year 2014, allowing them to
maintain their position over other tablets running Android or Microsoft operating
systems (Nguyen & Chaparro, 2011). Few IT leaders saw iPads as healthcare
“game-changers,” especially with the view of iPad EHR implementations as a way
to promote useful compliance for physicians (ClickCare, 2014). The usage of iPads
occur more rapidly than expected by IT professional specialist in healthcare; in
result, iPad had accelerated EHR implementation.
Figure 2.2. Android vs. Apple Ownership Comparison (ClickCare, 2014)
A possible problem for employee personnel using iPads within the work place
are operating system and application software updates. The updates for iPads uses
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iOS updates, which is an operating system manufacture by Apple Inc. protecting
not only the device itself but also its data, and the entire ecosystem (Apple, 2015).
This includes everything users do locally on networks and with various Internet
services. If an employee is using an iPad that is suppose to be running on iOS 9.1,
but is running iOS 8; this could possibly result into exploited vulnerabilities.
Updates are issued to fix bugs that may have caused a problem before-hand with
the previous iOS update. Apple had issued several updates over the years such as:
iOS 7, iOS 8, and currently iOS 9.1.
iOS 4.2.1 was released on November 22, 2010 which added iPad compatibility
- the beginning of the iPad updates. Using an issued iPad for work within the
hospital should not cause many problems, because the technicians on-site will have
access to install the necessary updates. In addition to mainting software updates,
another possible problem is malware.
Malware is becoming an increasing threat for mobile devices. Malware is a
malicious software use to disrupt an users PC, and can also be used for various
malicious intent. For example, malware can be used to spy on the users browsing,
collect sensitive data or carry out identity theft. There are many methods of
deploying malware. For security purposes, Apple iOS devices allow users to install
applications only from the Apple App Store as a security method. Apple Inc.
reviews the application systemically (Felt, Finifter, Chin, Hanna, & Wagner, 2011).
In addition to malware becoming a rising threat, theft is a high risk as well for
iPads.
Devices can sometime result into theft. Sixty-four (64) percent of enterprise
respondents reported that users devices containing sensitive data have been lost or
stolen (Morrow, 2012). According to Apple’s iOS 9.1 Software License Information
(Apple, 2015):
If your device is lost or stolen and you have “Find My iPhone” enabled, you
can use “Find My iPhone” to attempt to suspend the ability to pay with the
virtual credit and debit cards on the device by putting it into Lost Mode
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(Apple, 2015).
BYOD must be protected by HIPAA. Manufactures who develop the devices, have
protection schemes in place (Morrow, 2012). In today’s society, firewalls are
commonly used to conceal data from observation. Nearly every organization has a
range of authentication as well as secure layers and transport layer security
encryption (Morrow, 2012). Firewall protection is great to use as the a way to
recover from a possible data breach incident. With employees using their own
devices, this does create vulnerabilities. For instance, IT technicians check
keyboards for key loggers and software for any known malware; yet, with outside
devices entering the building,this carries different challenges (e.g ensuring the
proper security software is install on the staff’s privately own device). This can
affect the organization because it could seriously put patients personal information
at risk. The process of recognizing if an employees device is being targeted can be
problematic. According to Morrow (2012)’s study, “Sixty-eight (68) percent said
employees [within the health organization] have no way of identifying known mobile
device vulnerabilities that could be affecting their network.” Despite the potential
risk involving of iPads, the budget for healthcare security and security training
protect data breaches and security data vulnerabilities.
2.2 Budget
The U.S government allocated approximately 19 billion dollars a year in
funding for programs to help healthcare providers implement EHR as part of the
economic stimulus package enacted in February 2009 (Bardhan & Thouin, 2012).
EHR has undoubtedly made an impact within the healthcare industry. The
estimated net benefit from using an EHR system for a five-year period is 86,400
dollars per provider (Collum & Bisakha, 2015). Several studies have reported
evidences of the positive impact of EHR on healthcare quality, including lower
mortality rates, higher vaccination rates, and patient safety indicators (Bardhan &
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Thouin, 2012). This is important for hospitals as it earns a valuable profit in
return, just as a regular business does; however, with EHR records being
interconnected, there have been several data breach reports coming in as the years
pass by. Security breaches are concerns for electronic records just as lost or
misplaced paper were previouly. Under the Subtitle D-Privacy, Sec. 13400.
Definitions in the HITECT Act;
the term “breach” means the unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or
disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or
privacy of such information, except where an unauthorized person to whom
such information is disclosed would not reasonably have been able to retain
such information (HealthIT.gov, 2013)
The value of health information security is increasing rapidly. With data breaches
happening constantly, it is causing the economy to spend more money to increase
security. These new penalties, ranging up to $1.5 million, are linked to the severity
of the violation; likewise, many states have implemented breach notification laws
over the past decade (Kwon & Johnson, 2013). It is estimated that medical data
breaches cost $6.5 billion to the healthcare industry (Fowler, 2015). Figure 2.4
displays the total government spending leading up to a five year period.
The government spent $1,096 billion in 2010 for healthcare; however, between
the years 2011 to 2015, the amount of money spent had increased. The financial
spending did decrease from 2011 to 2013; but there was a significant increase until
2014. According to the Figure 2.4, the spending for healthcare is expected to
increase in the year 2016. In order to decrease the number of data breaches,
national efforts to advance health IT have not adequately addressed privacy
(McGraw et al., 2009).
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Figure 2.3. U.S Healthcare Total Government Spending (Five-Year
Period) (Chantrill, 2015)
2.3 Government Guidelines
EHR are designed to be accessed easily from remote sites such as a clinic
across town or even across the country. It is likely that data will be lost or
misplaced. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of
1996 amended a framework for privacy and security that requires compliance in
transmission and disclosure of certain patient data (Taitsman, Grimm, & Agrawal,
2013). The sole purpose of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is to protect the privacy of
individually identifiable health information (HHS.gov, 2011). According to
Horowitz (2006), “privacy is inherently an ethical concept that is understood to
represent something other than an individuals obligation to show and tell all”
(Horowitz, 2006).
Even with HIPAA in place, there are few exploitations occurring; however, it
has allowed, EHR managers become better prepared to handle the situation.
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According to Redspin (2013), “one must think of IT security as a chronic illness, a
condition that requires ongoing treatment, testing, and re-evaluation.” Exploitations
will happen every so often, but that is how security analysts learn what
vulnerabilities need to be addressed. The ongoing treatment and testing needed to
make the security better is the purpose of Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECT). HITECT Act was noted as Title
XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery; the
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L 111-5) is mainly to provide a structure to
protecting EHR (HealthIT.gov, 2009). According to the HITECT Act, it included
the first federal data security breach notification requirements; in addition, it also
required HHS to conduct HIPAA privacy and security audits (Solove, 2013).
California enacted the first Security Breach Notification Laws (SNBL) in 2002
making the problem of inadequate information security in American business visible
to the public for the first time (Winn, 2009).
The Department of Health and Human Service set an interim final rule
explaining unsecured EHR. Unsecured EHRs are extremely dangerous; in fact, the
Federal Register (Vol. 74 No.79, 2009) defines standards for data must be
encryption. Encrypted data “the use of an algorithmic process to transform data
into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a
confidential process or key is in use today” (45 CFR 164 304, 2015). Cryptography
cannot keep data information 100 percent safe, but it surely has a lower risk of data
breaches. According to Redspin (2013), the existing HIPAA Security Rule reads:
“Conduct or review a security risk analysis in accordance with the
requirements under 45 CFR 164.308(A) (1), including addressing the
encryption/security of data stored in CEHRT in accordance with
requirements under 45 CFR 164.312 (a) (2) (iv) and 45 CFR 164.306(d) (3),
and implement security updates as necessary and correct identified security
deficiencies as part of the providers risk management process for eligible
hospitals” Redspin (2013).
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In technical terms, this statement from the existing HIPAA Security Rule gives
hospitals the options on encrypting thier data. According to Redspin (2013), an
“addressable” requirement has the idea of something that is less than mandatory.
However, the Federal government could fix that with one simple change to the
HIPAA Security Rule. Redspin suggests that a certain hospital decide not to
encrypt their data but may also it serve as a target.
2.4 Breach Notification
When data could be possibly be at risk of a known employees must be
trained myriad of information that could be used for malicious purposes. The
breach notification provisions of Section 13402 apply to HIPAA covered entities and
their business associates that access, maintain, retain, modify, record, store, destroy,
or otherwise hold, use, or disclose unsecured EHR (Federal Register (Sections 13402
(a) and (b)) (Vol. 74 No.79, 2009). If a possible risk of data breach occurs, there is
a breach notification requirement and must be reported to the Secretary.
According to HHS Breach Notification Rule, the covered entity must include
a toll-free phone number that remains active for at least 90 days where individuals
can learn if their information was involved in the breach. The toll-free phone
number is a way that individuals can call to reach businesses without being charged
for the call. The most common toll-free phone numbers used today are: 800, 888,
877, 855, and 844. Informing the media is similar to the informing the individual.
When informing the media, the incident has to be notified no later than 60 days
following the discovery of the data breach and has to include the same information
mentioned to the individual when notified. After notifying the individual and
media, the secretary is the next person to be notified. Security breaches affecting
fewer than 500 individuals are to be notified to the secretary no later than 60 days;
however, more than 500 individuals are to be notified without unreasonable delay
(HHS.gov, 2011). In addition to notifying a breach, HHS has develop a formal
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reporting process to the Office of Civil Rights. The Office of Civil Rights submission
form is broken into five sections: covered entity, business associate, breach, notice of
breach and actions taken, and attestation. There are two different forms: “Breaches
Affecting 500 or More Individuals” and “Breaches Affecting Fewer than 500
Individuals.” It is imperative to notify the Secretary about the issue of discovered
breach as mentioned in CFT Title 45, Subtitle A, Subchapter C, Part 164, Subpart
D, 164.408:
Standard. A covered entity shall, following the discovery of a breach of
unsecured protected health information as provided in 164.404(a) (2), notify
the Secretary.
After the breach notification, patients are notified of the possible security risk
situation, HIPAA included penalty fines (see Table 2.1) which are effective today.
According to the Federal Register (Vol. 74 No. 209, 2009), the violations are
defined in four tiers. The description of the tier violations are as followed:
• Tier 1 represents covered entity or individual did not know the act was
HIPAA violation (Vol. 74 No. 209, 2009).
• Tier 2 represents having a reasonable cause and was not due to willful neglect
(Vol. 74 No. 209, 2009).
• Tier 3 represents an incident that was due to willful neglect but the violation
was corrected within the required time period (Vol. 74 No. 209, 2009).
• Tier 4 represents an incident that was due to willful neglect and was not
corrected (Vol. 74 No. 209, 2009).
2.5 Summary
Due to many benefits, EHR is continuously expanding in today’s healthcare
industry. Security threats are expanding to exploite vulnerabilities in EHR. BYOD
19
Table 2.1






is now a key important aspect within healthcare. Various of government guidelines
and acts are established to protect patients privacy and to set a security structure
for EHR are all presently being use within hospital organizations. To protect
patient information, healthcare spending on EHR had been increasing after the year
2012 and is expected to increase this year. Data breaches are hurting health
organizations financially due to the level of data breaches. Data breaches are
occurring through different aspects. It is important to determine if the BYOD
policy serves as a risk possibly causing an increase of data breaches.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
The intent of this research was to determine if the BYOD policy could be a
risk causing an increase in data breaches. To narrow the number of devices used by
healthcare professional users, iPads was used by this exploratory research work.
This chapter describes the method of research and data collection; also, the
flow diagram used to create the simulation model. Due to the nature of the
research, the researcher was primarily focused on a qualitative study.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
A simulation model was created using AnyLogic software to compare wireless
devices and desktop computer based on the nurse and doctor usage. With the
focused hospital, Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health - Lafayette East Health included
in the simulation model, the model was ran twice: once with the staff using iPads
only thorough the clinic; secondly, with desktops. Employee computer practices
including logging out, leaving desktop computers unattended, and advantage taken
by the patient due to employee negligence. Based on both runs, a comparison was
made to compare issues between the BYOD policy and desktop computers usage.
3.1.1 AnyLogic
In order to accurately simulate the model to compare the security risk
factors, AnyLogic served as the best option because it provided a simple way to
model the EHR risk factors. In addition, AnyLogic is a risk-free method that
cannot cause any damage to BYOD to test the methods within a health clinic.
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System dynamics was used to create the simulation modeling. “The goal of
systems thinking and system dynamics modeling is to improve our understanding of
the ways in which an organizations performance is related to its internal structure
and operating policies, including those of customers, competitors, and suppliers and
then to use that understanding to design high leverage policies for success,” as
mentioned by Sterman (2000).
3.2 Sample Set
The sample set used in the model considered of one nurse and doctor within
the model in an ideal healthcare clinic office setting. The patients entered into the
model was randomly generated based on an entrance rate, which is later define in
the next chapter.
3.3 Testing Methodology
The flow diagram developed based on my ideal healthcare office, shown in
Figure 3.1, served as the basis for creating the simulation model to test the
methodology of the BYOD policy. Based on a eight hour work day (eight A.M to
five P.M) excluding the one hour lunch break, within the clinic of Franciscan St.
Elizabeth Health- Lafayette East, the average waiting time in the clinic and
patients’ attention provided the model opportunities for data comprise.
Figure 3.1 shows the main parts of the model and the model setup screen via
screen capture. The model began with the patient entering into the model. At the
origin of the model, the patient entered based on the type of emergency. There is a
split outcome of emergency or non-emergency entrance. If it is an emergency
(bottom line), the patient was directed to the treatment room as quickly as possible
and exit the model; however, if it is a basic check-up procedure for instance. The
patient proceeded through the top line to registration. After the registration was
completed, the patient waited in the rest area; meanwhile, the nurse prepared the
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patent’s EMR. On the first run, the model was ran with the nurse and doctor using
only iPads; however, the second run consisted of using only desktop computers. The
nurse and doctor worked on the patient’s EMR from either a desktop or iPad.
Afterwards, the nurse moved to the patient.
Figure 3.1. Simulation Flow Diagram
Once the nurse completed the patient’s examination, there was an output for
the nurse. Based on the first run (using wireless devices), the output consisted on
whether or not the iPad was stolen while in the treatment room with the patient; in
addition, whether or not the nurse and doctor signed out of the device resulted into
a missing unsecured device. The second run consisted on whether or not the nurse
and doctor left the desktop unattended while being with the patient; in addition, to
whether or not the staff logged-out. The number of times the patient took
advantage of the situation was another factor closely monitored. The threat of
having a patient hacking into the clinic system also becomes another risk. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, HIPAA has current tier violations which are in placed
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today. To reduced the complexity, tier one violation (staff was not aware of the
situation) was used in the model.
To calculate the risk of using iPads and desktop computers within the health
clinic, the risk assessment method by (Cox Jr, 2008) was used:
Equation 1 : Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Impact
Based on the focus of the research, the threat of causing data breaches within the
health clinic with the usage of iPads and desktops was compared. The vulnerability
on the usage of both wireless and wired devices was provided by Bitglass (2014). To
quantify the HIPAA tier violation one, the tier violations was used as a severity
rate: one being the lowest severity, whereas, four being highest severity. Chapter D.
Demonstrate Mathematics demonstrates how Equation 1 was used to calculate the
risk of both BYOD and desktop computers. Once the risk was calculated, the
patient’s overall time from both model runs was recorded, averaged and compared.
The model was averaged using the fraction, risk
4
. The denominator, four,
represented as the risk over the number of HIPAA tier violations. Given the average
risk for both threats, average wait time, and total time of the clinic hours for a
one-day period; the risk of data breach due to patient waiting time was calculated
using the formula in Equation 2:





This chapter covered the qualitative research framework and method used in
the study, what was being tested, and research questions. It also discussed the logic
of the simulation model used to determine which EHR method had the lowest risk.
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CHAPTER 4. PRESENTATION OF DATA
As describe in the previous chapters, the purpose of this study was to
determine if the BYOD policy was becoming a liability risk within hospitals by
comparing a wireless device to desktop computer together. The focus devices
compared was iPads and desktop computers. To reduce the complexity, the
researcher ran the simulation model with one nurse and doctor observing the risk
when treating the patient.
4.1 Initial Inputs and Parameters
The initial setup for the simulation model used data input listed in Table 4.1.
The model randomly generated an approximate of 2,700 patients based on the
arrival rate. The arrival rate for the patient was set for one every ten minute; while
the nurse and doctor arrive rate was set for one per minute. The variable,
“Probability of Emergency” and choice of “Wait Location” was undetermined;
therefore, it was measured as 0.3. In technical terms, 3
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of the patients that entered




Parameters Numbers Used Source
Wait time 24 minutes (Groeger, Tigas, & Wei, 2015)
Misplaced Device 0.68 (McCarthy, 2014)
System hack 0.23 (Bitglass, 2014)
Mobile Device Insecurity 0.32 (Ponemon Institute, 2015)
Did not logout 0.70 (Ponemon Institute, 2015)
Tier 1 0.30 Center (2015)
Desktop unattended 0.70 (Ponemon Institute, 2015)
4.2 Process
The model took a simple approach towards patients attempting to take
advantage due to employee negligence within the clinic while using either wireless or
wired devices. Employee negligence was used as whether the nurse or doctor logged
out of their desktop and if the desktop was left unattended.
The model assumed that for every patient that entered the model, each was
seen and examined by one nurse and doctor before the leaving the clinic. The model
ran twice on an eight-hour day period to determine if the BYOD policy had a
lowest risk factor than the usage of desktops.
4.3 Recorded Data Collection
The results recorded from AnyLogic was solely based on the data taken from
Table 4.1 (Model Parameters). The first model experiment (using iPads) was
completed and displayed depending on the number of times the staff misplaced their
iPad when examining the patient. This occurred three out of ten times. The iPad
was not logged out one time out ten which resulted into an unprotected device.
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Throughout the eight hour day, there was a one out ten times a patient took
advantage of the misplaced, unprotected iPad.
The second model experiment (using desktops) was completed and displayed
that the desktop was left unattended three out of ten times; in addition, seven out
of ten time the staff did not logged out of the desktop. The advantage taken by the
patient resulted into one out of ten times. Table 4.2 displays the results from
AnyLogic simulation.
Table 4.2
Model Results: Wireless vs. Wired
Table 4.3
Model Run 1: Wireless Device
Model Experiment One Occurrence
Misplaced iPad 3 out of 10
Advantage taken 1 out of 10
Unsecured device 1 out of 10
Table 4.4
Model Run 2: Wired Device
Model Experiment Two Occurrence
Advantage taken 1 out of 10
Unattended desktop 3 out of 10
Did not logged-out 7 out of 10
The results from the simulation model was used by comparing the overall lowest risk
involving each focused potential risk. Experiment one
The first model run generated a total of 2,659 patients within a eight hours
period. There were 717 patients that choose to wait inside the clinic while others
choose to wait in the parking lot before seeing the doctor while the nurses also
prepare the patient medical record for the doctor usage. The second model run
generated a total of 2,730 patients. Six hundred and eighty (680) patients choose to
wait inside the clinic.
4.4 Calculated Risk
To calculate the risk of BYOD and desktops, Table 4.5 displays the value
used for the threat and vulnerability. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the researcher
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focused on tier one violation. The quantified tier violation was used as the
consequence within the risk equation.
Table 4.5
Risk Value Input
Variables Numbers Used Source
Desktop threat 0.17 (HIMSS, 2015)
BYOD threat 0.29 (Ponemon Institute, 2015)
Vulnerability 0.48 (Bitglass, 2014)
Using the risk assessment equation, the risk for using iPads and desktop was
calculated using only tier one violation; in addition, the vulnerability involving
desktops and mobile devices potentially causing data breaches, according to Bitglass
(2014). As mentioned in Chapter 3, Chapter D. Demonstrate Mathematics provides
examples of how the risk was calculated. Table The calculated risk based on a tier
one violation






The calculation for the risk of both desktop and iPads was used as the risk of a tier
one violation.
Patients waiting in the treatment room also presented a risk. The average
wait time in Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health - Lafayette East Health was 24
minutes (Groeger et al. (2015). Given the risk of either BYOD or desktop, average
wait time (24 minutes), and total time of the clinic business hours (8 hours = 480
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∗480mins)−(24minutes) . Using iPads in the treatment room when treating the




In conclusion, giving the increasing threats to IT infrastructure, the BYOD
policy had a lower risk than using desktops within health clinics. Due to the results,
the BYOD policy was not considered a liability risk. The focused BYOD, iPads,
proved to have a lower risk compared to using desktop computer when treating
patients. Using desktop computers within the treatment room had a summation
risk of 20.4% compared to using iPads which had a summation risk of 34.8%.
According to research, using wireless devices increases efficiency and flexibility when
using EHR systems to update patient EMR compared to using desktop computers;
however, the increase of data breaches was the main concern involving new policies
and security measures.




∗480mins)−(AverageWaitT ime) . Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health - Lafayette East
Health average wait time was used as the “Average Wait Time”. The
patient/employee wait time contributed a huge factor. Using iPads to prepare
patients’ EMR for the doctors usage when examining the patient resulted to a
solution of 0.699; however, using a desktop computer resulted to a solution of 1.353.
Uniquely, the summation risk for iPad was higher than the summation risk for
desktops, but the risk of time when using iPad proved to be lower than desktops.
Comparing the risk when using iPads and desktops, the simulation model
also proved iPads used within the clinic had a lower risk than desktops. The first
run consisted of one nurse and doctor which both used an iPad to utilize patients’
EMR in the clinic; unlike the second run, consisted the usage of desktop computers.
The material needs was recorded after performing the two model runs. The focus of
the simulation model was as followed: the number of times the nurse and doctor
was victim of a stolen iPad, leaving the desktop unattended/unsecured device, and
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potential opportunity taken by patient due to employee negligence. Based on the
first run using iPads in the treatment room, the device was stolen three out of ten
times during a typical work day. The number of times the nurse and doctor did not
logged out resulting into an unsecured device occurred one out of ten times; in
addition, one out of ten times the patient took advantage of the situation despite
the occurrence of negligence’s. Model run two consisted of three out ten times which
the desktop computer was left unattended when treating patient. There was also an
occurrence of seven out of ten forgotten to logged out of the computer. Despite the
negligence, few patients took advantage of the situation two out of ten times.
The risk for the BYOD policy could possibly be lower if employee negligence
were to decrease from 70%. Because of the increase of negligence caused by
employees, it is recommended enacting an outcome of mandatory employee clinical
re-training to reduce the employee negligence. Mandatory clinical training could
possibly lower the risk of employee negligence which could cause a decrease of the
BYOD risk. Also to decrease employee negligence, increasing communication
through-out the clinic could help. Decreasing employee negligence could slightly
reduce the government spending like-wised in the year 2012.
The model can be used in future research to test new IT equipment and
policies within healthcare clinics. For example, a hospital could use the model to
analyze whether or not patients are leaving without seeing the doctor due to
emergency waiting. Research also needs to be performed to determine the risk
factors and calculate the risk analysis in order to calculate the summation;
emergency waiting time distribution; and understanding of HIPAA violations of
specify incident. That research should also include a focused health clinic to include
wait time. The research performed in this study demonstrated a possible liability
risk factor used widely within clinics based on nine hour business day proving that
the BYOD policy is not consider as a liability risk.
APPENDICES
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CHAPTER A. HEALTH CLINIC LAYOUT
Figure A.1. Health Clinic Layout
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CHAPTER B. BYOD SIMULATION MODEL
Figure B.1. BYOD Simulation Model
33
CHAPTER C. DESKTOP SIMULATION MODEL
Figure C.1. Desktop Simulation Flow
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CHAPTER D. DEMONSTRATE MATHEMATICS
Equation 1 : Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Impact
Equation 1 was used to calculate the risk for using Ipads and desktops within the
health clinic. Example of how to used equation: according to (Ponemon Institute,
2015), the threat for using IPads is 29%. The vulnerability, 48% was used. Based on
the impact, HIPAA tier violation one-four was used. The equation was set as the
followed:
Risk = 0.29 x 0.48 x 1




Equation 2 was to used to calculate the risk based on the time spent in the
treatment room with personnel. With one hundred as the numerator, and the value
of Equation 1 (the risk of either BYOD or desktop), multiplied by the 8 hour
business day (converted into minutes = 480) subtracting the average wait time
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